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ABSTRACT
In many countries, the governments rely heavily on tax revenue to finance 
the government expenditures. In Malaysia, 78.8% of the source of revenue 
is from tax revenue and mainly contributed by the corporate income tax. 
The past literature has documented that good corporate governance could 
increase the firm’s performances as well as tax compliance. Malaysia 
published its own code of corporate governance in March 2000 and revised 
it in 2007, 2011 and 2012. Recently, in April 2016, the Security Commission 
released the recommended MCCG 2016. Thus, judging from the importance 
of maintaining tax collection, this paper aims to examine the importance 
of corporate governance in ensuring tax compliance among public listed 
companies in Malaysia. This study finds that corporate governance does 
influence tax compliance and multiple directorships is the most significant 
in influencing tax compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
In Malaysia, tax contributes the highest source of revenue in developing the 
economy and is the most reliable source of government spending. According 
to the 4th quarter of the Malaysian Economic Report 2015 published by the 
Malaysian Treasury Department, the total tax revenue collected in 2015 
was RM44.1 billion which constitutes 78.8% of total revenue of the federal 
government. The tax revenue in Malaysia is derived from two sources, 
which are direct taxes (stamp duties, income tax from individuals, corporate 
income taxes and petroleum taxes) and indirect taxes (GST, import duties, 
excise duty and export duty). In 2015, the total tax revenue from the direct 
taxes was RM28.4 billion which made up of 23.8% from total tax revenue 
while the indirect taxes was RM15.7 billion which was equivalent to 56.2% 
from total tax collection. Direct taxes are collected by the Inland Revenue 
Board of Malaysia (IRBM) while indirect taxes are collected by the Royal 
Custom and Excise Department. In Malaysia, the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) was implemented on 1 April 2015 at a rate of 6% and will replace 
the current sales and services tax regime. The decision of the government to 
change its system to GST has significant implications and is an interesting 
economic issue in Malaysia. It is therefore important for the government to 
ensure a prudent taxation policy in order to maintain and improve its global 
competitiveness and to attract domestic and foreign investors.
In Malaysia, all companies are required to declare and calculate 
their taxable income by using the self-assessment system (SAS). The 
primary objective of SAS implemented in Malaysia is to improve the level 
of voluntary compliance, reducing administrative costs and simplifying 
the assessment system (Isa, 2014). The impact of SAS has shifted more 
responsibilities to the taxpayers in ensuring the filing of accurate returns, 
and proper keeping of records for audit purposes. It also encourages better 
understanding of other income tax legislations so as to avoid penalties. 
Accordingly, some literature supports that knowledge is crucial and plays 
a significant role in enhancing compliance behaviour. If a taxpayer has 
insufficient knowledge, it may result in inaccurate tax returns and hence 
lead to non-compliance. Some studies argue that the complexity of a tax 
system may also influence non-compliance. According to Isa (2014), most 
companies are able to prepare their financial records based on the accounting 
standard but could not prepare their tax computation based on tax laws. 
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Difficulty in understanding the system would discourage a taxpayer from 
acquiring sufficient tax knowledge resulting in continuous non-compliance.
Tax compliance behaviour is an area of concern to tax policymakers 
in the world as non-compliance will significantly affect revenue collections, 
thereby, causing losses to the government (Isa, 2014). Non-compliance could 
also result in severe reputation damage and financial consequences as a result 
of increased penalties and tax liabilities to the companies. Therefore, it is 
imperative to find ways to increase tax compliance as it will increase tax 
collection. Tax compliance can be defined as complying with the tax rules 
and regulations, which encompasses the filing, reporting and payment of 
tax. Tax non-compliance can be divided into tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
According to Norshamimi & Noor (2012), tax planning is synonymous to tax 
avoidance, as it is done within the provisions of the Income Tax Act which 
benefits the stakeholders in the form of tax burden reduction. However, if 
done aggressively, tax avoidance becomes tax evasion. 
In Malaysia, numerous studies have been done to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Most 
studies support the notion that good corporate governance will lead to high 
performance. A company with high performance tends to comply with 
all the laws and regulations set by the authorities. Moreover, a company 
with high performance cares about their reputation and would want to 
develop a good brand name leading to better credibility as a player in the 
market. By practising sound corporate governance, it could enhance tax 
compliance as effective tax governance frameworks could be established 
in line with the overall governance framework. Currently, limited studies 
have been done on the relationship between corporate governance and tax 
compliance specifically in Malaysia. Prior studies in Malaysia used effective 
tax rate (ETR) as a measure of tax compliance (Shamsudin & Noor, 2012). 
Thus, this study aims to fill in the gap by examining whether MCCG 2012 
influenced tax compliance in public listed companies in Malaysia for the 
period after the revised MCCG 2011 (2012 – 2014). This study focuses on 
the internal mechanism of the corporate governance such as board size, 
board independence, multiple directorships and CEO duality. The remainder 
of this paper is structured as follows: the second section is the literature 
review followed by the research method and hypotheses development. The 
next section is the discussion of empirical results, and the last section is the 
conclusion and limitation of the study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate Governance in Malaysia
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 – 1998 had influenced the 
development of the corporate governance in many South-east Asian 
countries including Malaysia. Corporate scandals that happened in several 
countries such as Enron and Adelphia in the US, Satyam in India and Port 
Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) in Malaysia have brought the attention of many 
parties to brainstorm to curb these fraud cases from reoccurring. Among 
the remedial actions that arise from these incidences are the introduction 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in US and the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) in Malaysia. Many countries have started to realise 
the importance of having sound corporate governance to create a conducive 
environment for corporate sectors to be efficient and to sustain growth. In 
the current global business environment, a company faces intense scrutiny 
from the government and regulatory bodies. In order to survive in these 
circumstances, many countries have developed their own coordinated 
strategy to minimise the impact on the company and stakeholders. In 
Malaysia, the financial crisis in 1997 has highlighted the weaknesses in 
corporate governance shown by the failure of numerous companies during 
and after the crisis. Consequentially, efforts were made to rectify and 
improve the corporate governance system.
Corporate governance can be defined as the structures and processes 
for the direction and control of companies. In general, corporate governance 
deals with the relationship between management, the board of directors, 
shareholders and stakeholders, and how companies are managed and 
controlled. By practising good corporate governance, it will help in the 
ability of the company to sustain and enhance its performance. In March 
2000, Malaysia introduced the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG 2000). However, the compliance with the code is not mandatory. 
MCCG targets public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia which requires 
the preparation of financial statements based on the recommendations in 
MCCG. MCCG focuses on the main amendments aimed at strengthening 
the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and audit committee 
and ensuring that they discharge their duties effectively (MCCG, 2000). To 
ensure corporate governance principles are aligned with the current business 
MAR Vol 16 No. 2 Dec 2017.indd   160
161
Malaysian Code of Corporate GovernanCe and tax CoMplianCe
practices and market developments, the code was revised in 2007, 2011 and 
2012. In April 2016, the Security Commission released the proposed draft 
of the MCCG 2016. The latest MCCG 2016 set out four principles namely, 
supporting board leadership and effectiveness, safeguarding the integrity 
of financial and corporate reporting, managing risks to preserve and create 
value, and strengthening the relationship with shareholders.
In corporate governance, the role of directors can be divided into 
several areas. Among the areas are board size, board independence, multiple 
directorships and CEO duality.
CEO Duality
The CEO Duality is a serious issue as it is related to the agency cost. 
According to Jensen (1993), a CEO cannot monitor the board distinct to 
his personal interest. A study in Tunisia found that the governance guide 
of good practices, in the interest of efficiency recommends a separation 
between the functions of the Chairman of the board and the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). If however, CEO Duality is chosen, it is recommended that 
the board justifies to the shareholders the reasons why the choice was made 
based on the corporate governance guide. 
Sharma (2004) supported the existence of a relationship between CEO 
Duality and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Furthermore, Klein 
(2002) found a negative association between duality and performance. 
Currently, Minnick and Noga (2010) found that firms offering duality in the 
CEO position have less tax management and higher tax expenses. Based 
on the arguments above, this study hypothesises:
H1: Duality is negatively associated with Tax Compliance.
Multiple Directorships
Multiple directorships refers to the situation where directors sit on 
more than one board (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). A director can either be an 
active director or a compliant director. If they are successful in performing 
their role in either one, they are more likely to build a reputation and win 
additional directorships (Rowe & Sivadasan, 2014). For instance, active 
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directors who provide high-quality management oversight are more likely 
to attain extra directorships, while compliant directors who are willing to 
allow greater management discretion are also likely to receive additional 
directorships. Directors who have multiple directorships are believed to 
lead companies to better tax compliance. Having multiple directorships 
will benefit the companies in many ways (Richardson, 1987). First, they 
serve as an influential source of information; and second, they serve as a 
mechanism for control. Nevertheless, multiple directorships also provide 
some drawbacks. First, a good corporate governance has nothing to do with 
multiple directorships (Dooley, 1969; Mariolis, 1975). It is also seen as a 
means for inter-corporate collusion and inter-organisational elite co-optation 
and cooperation (Allen, 1974 & Useem, 1984). 
Multiple directorships are favourites in UK companies as they will 
provide directors with wider experience, allow personal development and 
the attainment of new ideas and improve business contacts (Ward, 1998). In 
the case of Malaysia, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also supported the finding 
made by Ward (1998). They found that multiple directorships are common 
among non-executive directors and it may be valuable for companies 
as they will help directors to be more aware of their responsibilities as 
well as widening their experience and knowledge of business activities, 
especially in the case of Malaysia where many such directors are perceived 
as incompetent (Othman, 1999). Based on the arguments above, this study 
hypothesises that:
H2: Multiple directorships is positively correlated with Tax Compliance.
Board independence
After the collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen way back in 2001, the 
US Government introduced a new reform which is Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 
to mitigate the occurrences of fraud. It establishes strict new rules regarding 
corporate governance and assumes that firms with outside directors are more 
efficient in observing management. Prior researchers have focused on the 
effects of board composition on corporate performance. However, much 
attention was given to the question of how board characteristics can have 
an influence on corporate tax planning (Khaoula & Mohamed Ali, 2012). 
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The composition of the board of directors is a critical feature in 
establishing a board; thus, it should guarantee that the board attends to the 
mutual interests of all shareholders. Minnick & Noga (2010) indicate that 
independent directors can strengthen tax management because they can 
offer valuable knowledge and background from their personal industry and 
experience.  A study done by Lanis & Richardson (2011) showed that a board 
with a higher percentage of outside directors leads to increase effectiveness 
in monitoring the function of the board. In other words, companies with more 
efficient control of management are less likely to be involved in corporate 
fraud; and indirectly will mitigate the non-executive directors to engage in 
this type of behaviour due to little incentive to do it (Yermack, 2004). Due 
to that, this study hypothesises:
H3: The board’s independence is positively correlated with Tax 
Compliance.
Board Size
The board size is one of the most important elements in corporate 
governance. According to Abeysekera (2010), the efficiency and 
effectiveness of that the board members share to fulfil their responsibilities 
are affected by the size of the board. The international guidelines have 
mentioned the importance of the board characteristics since it will reflect 
on good corporate governance. For many years, the board composition 
and structure have received much attention (Bennedsen et al., 2008; 
Cheng, 2008). Many risks may affect the business such as the changes 
in regulations, political and technologies and economic conditions. The 
board is not only responsible for approving the company’s strategies and 
monitor the mitigation strategies taken to minimise risks, but also have a 
major responsibility towards the company for the company to achieve their 
goal congruence.  
Large board size does not guarantee the efficiency of the company 
(Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). It is because the agency problem may take place 
when the board becomes too big due to directors’ free riding and most 
importantly the board has become a lesser part of the management. On 
another note, a large board may influence the board easier (Cheng, 2008: 
Ozdemir & Upneja, 2012). CEO will use their power for their own benefits 
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rather than the shareholders’ interest. The board composition will influence 
the tax planning of the company. Since the result is still mixed, there is a 
need to study the relationship between the board size and Tax Compliance. 
The board size is represented by the number of the members of the board. 
Based on the discussion above, it is hypothesised that:
H4: Board size is positively associated with Tax Compliance. 
Corporate Governance and Tax Compliance
The Malaysian Government has put greater effort toward the 
development of tax system. Taxes are significant issues for all countries in 
the world especially for Malaysia because one of the primary revenues for 
the Government is generated from tax. It is also an important element for 
companies as it represents the significant amount of profit of the company 
(Ozdemir & Upneja, 2012). For that reason, many companies are very 
careful in planning their taxable income in order to minimise the tax 
liabilities. Tax planning is synonymous to tax avoidance (Sabli & Noor, 
2012). In order to reduce tax liabilities, tax avoidance will be included in 
tax planning calculation. The company may enjoy tax shelters or tax savings 
if they are efficiently managing their tax planning. Based on a study done 
by Sartori (2009), he found that tax planning will increase resulting in tax 
saving when there is an increase in tax rate. Desai & Dharmapala (2007) 
have stated several reasons why a company does tax planning. Among 
them is for the shareholders to get a higher dividend in which the managers 
would probably act to reduce the tax burden and maximise the profit after 
tax (Sartori, 2009). However, when the interest of the shareholders is not 
in line with the managers, the purpose of tax planning would become an 
opportunistic behaviour of managers. The managers tend to be involved in 
aggressive tax planning to increase the value of the company and the bottom 
line is as they would be rewarded with high remunerations. 
Having said that, tax planning is closely related to the tax compliance. 
As revenue increases, there is also an increase in non-tax compliance which 
will impact the authority. As the Malaysian Government relies heavily on 
tax revenue, non-compliance tax activities will affect the governmental and 
social welfare projects. According to Jabbar and Pope (2009), tax compliance 
is where the tax reporting requirements such as timely tax return submission 
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and accurate income and deduction are in accordance to the tax laws. On 
the other hand, non-tax compliance happens when companies deliberately 
disregard tax requirements and fail to meet their tax obligations. Among the 
type of non-tax compliance in Malaysia are, the failure to submit a tax return, 
understatement of income, overstatement of deductions and failure to pay 
assessed taxes by the due date. The primary effect of non-tax compliance 
is the upsurge in compliance costs. They will be fined and charged with a 
heavy penalty if the company is found overstating deductions if and when 
the tax authority is able to detect such activity. Additionally, the reputation 
of the companies will be tarnished as the shareholders will start to have bad 
impressions on how respective managers manage the company. 
The establishment of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) way back in 2001 was mainly to strengthen the rules and 
regulations for companies to follow in order to reduce the number of 
fraud cases. It covers many aspects of the business and therefore it has 
become very useful for the companies in establishing their policies and 
procedures. Consequently, it will protect the interest of the stakeholders. 
The tax environment has to be changed in overcoming the compliance issue 
(OECD, 2009).  Good corporate governance is closely related to tax. The 
issue of tax can be controlled together with sound governance (Shamsudin 
& Noor, 2012). The management must take into consideration the tax 
matter seriously (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). In MCCG, it was mentioned 
that the management is entirely responsible for the practise of appropriate 
corporate governance practices. Previously, the management will respond 
to tax matters only when tax evasion occurs. However, the function of the 
management is over and above in responding to issues on tax liabilities. 
They have to be involved in all other tax issues (Sartori, 2009).
Corporate governance has contributed a lot in managing the company 
more efficiently and effectively, especially so after the financial crisis. It can 
help the company sustain in the industry. For example, the way the company 
manages the tax matters will influence the financial matter. Hence, there 
is a need for good governance practices in order to create a better business 
environment. In practice, the role in managing the company’s tax affairs 
and strategies has become more significant for the management and it is no 
longer in the hands of tax agents wholly (OECD, 2009). Tax issues are not 
small issues. It has a significant effect on the company’s profitability. Thus, 
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it has to be handled carefully with appropriate tax planning and strategies 
because it could give a long term effect on the profitability of the company. 
Therefore, the standard of corporate governance and the awareness of the 
management can be increased in order to reduce tax risks. 
The business will be more transparent by having good corporate 
governance, and as a result, it will mitigate the management to divert the 
income to somewhere else. The bottom line for having sound corporate 
governance is, it will give a positive impact on the tax compliance issue. 
In other words, the greater the transparency level, the greater the tax 
compliance is. According to Sartori (2009), the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers are also aligned, which reduces the agency costs. 
It is supported with the collapse of giant corporations such as Enron and 
Adelphia due to the lack of transparency and poor corporate governance. 
Hence, when the company’s operation is well managed with enough 
transparency, it will then increase the confidence of the tax authorities. 
As a result, the tax authorities will conduct less tax audit. Furthermore, 
Smatrakalev (2006) found that the tax aggressiveness and tax avoidance 
strategies can be reduced through strong enforcement of the tax authority 
in which would result in the increase in transparency.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Framework
Below is the research framework developed specifically for the 
purpose of this study:
Independent Variables
• Duality (DUALITY)
• Multiple Directorships (MULTI)
• Board Compositions (BOARD)
• Board Size (BSIZE)
Control Variables
• Leverage (LEV)
• Capital Intensity (CAPINTEN)
• Firm Size (FSIZE)
Dependent Variable
Tax Compliance proxy 
by Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR)
Figure 3.1: Research Framework of Corporate Governance and Tax 
Compliance of Top 100 Companies based on Market Capitalization
As illustrated in Figure 3.1 above, the theoretical framework shows the 
interaction between corporate governance and tax compliance of Top 100 
companies based on market capitalization. The dependent variable (DV) is 
tax compliance proxy by the effective tax rate (ETR). According to Lanis 
& Richardson (2011), they used ETR to measure tax compliance and tax 
planning. In their study, ETR is measured by using the tax expenses divided 
by profit before tax (PBT). Deferred taxes are excluded in the calculation 
of tax expenses. However, for the purpose of this study, ETR is measured 
using tax expenses divided by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) (Lanis 
& Richardson, 2011). There are three main independent variables in this 
study, namely, duality (DUALITY), multiple directorships (MULTI), board 
composition (BOARD), and board size (BSIZE). According to Minnick 
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and Noga (2010), the selection of independent variables is specifically 
for corporate governance components, while the control variables in this 
study are leverage (LEV), capital intensity (CAPINTEN), and firm size 
(FSIZE). These control variables are common variables being used by other 
researchers in their study (Lanis & Richardson, 2011; Gupta &Newberry, 
1997 & Derashid & Zhang, 2003). 
The main objective of this study is to examine whether the elements 
of corporate governance will influence the tax compliance of the company. 
Thus, based on Figure 3.1, this study is intended to contribute to the new 
knowledge of the existing tax compliance and corporate governance that 
will be useful for the other scholars. 
Sample Collection
This study uses the secondary data which is the most commonly 
used method because of its suitability and easy to be applied due to time 
constraint. The financial data are collected from Datastream Thomson 
Reuters while for corporate governance elements, the annual reports are 
analysed. This study focuses on the Top 100 companies based on market 
capitalization as at December 2014. The three years period from 2012 to 
2014 was adopted in this study. Initially, a total of 300 companies were 
chosen. However, due to unavailability of data and outliers, the final sample 
was only 227 companies. 
Research Model
The regression model as per below is established in conducting this 
study.
ETR = β0 + β1DUALITY + β2MULTI + β3BOARD + β4BSIZE + 
β5LEV + β6CAPITEN + β7FSIZE
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Where:
ETR = Effective tax rate proxy for Tax Compliance, calculated by tax 
expenses divided with earnings before interest (EBIT).
DUALITY = Dichotomous with 1 if the chairman is also the chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the company and 0 otherwise
MULTI = The proportion of directors on the board of (%) the company 
having at least one additional directorship in another company 
to total number of directors on the board.
BOARD = Board composition; the proportion of non-executive directors 
(NEDs) to total number of directors on the board of the company.
BSIZE = Board size is represented by the total number of directors on the 
board of the company.
LEV  = Leverage is calculated by dividing the total debt with the total 
asset.
CAPITEN = Capital intensity is calculated by dividing the amount of property, 
plant and equipment (PPE) with the total asset.
FSIZE = Firm size is signified by the log total asset.
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Descriptive Analysis
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistic in a clear and understandable 
way about all the variables used in the current study. It presents the full 
samples of eight variables used in the analysis over the three-year period. 
It reports the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of each 
variable. The first variable is effective tax rate (ETR). The minimum and 
maximum of ETR are -0.59 and 8.56 respectively. Meanwhile, the mean and 
standard deviation of ETR are 0.27 and 0.786 respectively. In Malaysia, the 
statutory rate for a company is 25%. ETR is the percentage of the taxable 
income that companies effectively pay tax. Therefore, based on the average 
sample of this study, which is 27%, reflects that most companies in Malaysia 
have high income, thus pay more tax. 
There are four independent variables in this study which are CEO 
Duality (DUALITY), multiple directorships (MULTI), board composition 
(BOARD), and board size (BSIZE). The minimum and maximum of 
DUALITY are 0.00 and 1.00 respectively, while the mean and standard 
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deviation are 0.06 and 0.24 respectively. The MCCG 2012 recommends 
that the CEO and chairman positions should be separated. Therefore, the 
total sample indicates that 6% of the companies did not comply with the 
recommendation as the same individuals held the position of chairman 
and CEO of the company. The next independent variable is multiple 
directorships. The minimum and maximum of MULTI are 0.00 and 1.50 
respectively; while, the mean and standard deviation are 0.69 and 0.26 
respectively. In Malaysia, mostly there are seven directors on board that 
hold directorship in other companies. Then, the third independent variable 
is board composition (BOARD). The minimum and maximum of BOARD 
are 0.00 and 1.00 respectively, while the mean and standard deviation are 
0.46 and 0.12 respectively. The sample indicates that there are at least 
four independent directors on the board which comply with the MCCG 
requirement, which means that the company must have at least one-third of 
independent directors on the board. The last independent variable is board 
size (BSIZE). The minimum and maximum of BSIZE are 4.00 and 16.00 
respectively. In the meantime, the mean and standard deviation are 8.92 
and 2.09 respectively. Based on mean, the average board size in Malaysia 
is nine which implies that Malaysian companies have larger board size.
The control variables can be divided into three, which are leverage 
(LEV), capital intensity (CAPITEN), and firm size (FSIZE). The minimum 
and maximum of LEV are 0.00 and 60.19 respectively. Meanwhile, the 
mean and standard deviation are 21.88 and 16.65 respectively. The mean 
is distributed quite far from the maximum. Hence, most of the sample 
companies are using less debt in financing their investment and daily 
operation costs. The reason could be due to the capability of these companies 
in generating its own finance because these sample companies are the 
top 100 companies based on market capitalization in Malaysia. Next, the 
minimum and maximum for capital intensity (CAPITEN) are 0.00 and 
2.06 respectively, while, the mean and standard deviation are .40 and .28 
respectively. The last control variable is firm size (FSIZE). The minimum 
and maximum are 2.58 and 6.66 respectively; whereas, the mean and 
standard deviation are 3.90 and .86 respectively. The size of the sample 
firms are slightly higher than the minimum, which indicates that most of 
the firms are small size. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistic from 2012 – 2014
Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation
ETR -0.59 8.56 0.27 0.79
DUALITY 0.00 1.00 0.062 0.24
MULTI 0.00 1.50 0.6935 0.26
BOARD 0.00 1.00 0.4580 0.12
BSIZE 4.00 16.00 8.92 2.09
LEV 0.00 60.19 21.88 16.65
CAPITEN 0.00 2.06 0.40 0.28
FSIZE 2.58 8.66 3.90 0.86
Variables definitions are as follows:
ETR is a tax expense divided by Earnings before Interest and Tax 
(EBIT); DUALITY is the CEO Duality in a company; MULTI is a multiple 
directorships in a company; BOARD is a board composition; BSIZE is 
board size; LEV is the firm leverage measured as total debts divided by 
total asset; CAPITEN is capital intensity measured as fixed asset divided 
by total asset; FSIZE is firm size measured as log total asset. 
Pearson Correlation
Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix for the dependent and 
independent variables in this study. This test is conducted to identify the 
degree of the correlation exists between the explanatory variables. In general, 
there are three types of relationship between the variables which is either 
positive relationship, negative relationship and zero relationship. If the 
relationship is positive, it means to increase or decrease in one variable is 
followed by a corresponding increase or decrease in the other variables, 
meanwhile for negative relationship, increase or decrease in one variable 
is not followed by other variables. However, when the correlation is zero, 
increase in one variable is not associated with other variables. 
Based on the correlation result, only MULTI and FSIZE are correlated 
with ETR. There is a positive correlation between MULTI and ETR and it is 
significant at 1 %. ETR is the measurement for tax compliance. Therefore, 
the more a person holds multiple directorships in a company, it implies 
a higher tax compliance. It can be said that when a person holds many 
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directorships in many companies, they tend to be stricter in adhering to 
comply with the tax law. Next, FSIZE is positively correlated with ETR at 
5%. The correlation result implies that the larger the size of the firm, the 
higher the tax compliance. 
Table 4.2: Pearson Correlation from 2012 – 2014
ETR DUALITY MULTI BOARD BSIZE LEV CAPITEN FSIZE
ETR 1
DUALITY 1
MULTI  -.180** .060 1
BOARD .024   .211** .186** 1
BSIZE .056  -.268** -.011  -.373** 1
LEV .002 .009 -.079 .031 -.105 1
CAPITEN    .092    -.127     .034    .039   -.015 -.062     1
FSIZE  .133*    .185**   -.291** .033   -.157* .369** -.061 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Variables definitions are as follows:
ETR is a tax expense divided by Earnings before Interest and Tax 
(EBIT); DUALITY is the CEO Duality in a company; MULTI is a multiple 
directorships in a company; BOARD is a board composition; BSIZE is 
board size; LEV is the firm leverage measured as total debts divided by 
total asset; CAPITEN is capital intensity measured as fixed asset divided 
by total asset; FSIZE is firm size measured as log total asset.
Multiple Regression Analysis
Table 4.3 explains the multiple regression analysis conducted to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and tax compliance. 
The adjusted R-squared is 0.034 which indicates that only 3.4% of the 
variation in tax compliance can be explained by the overall explanatory 
variables in this study. Meanwhile, the F Value is 2.135, and it is significant 
at 5%. The significant results produced by ANOVA test indicate that the 
explanatory variables used have the impact on the tax compliance. There 
are four hypotheses tested in this study. Firstly, the CEO duality has the 
positive but insignificant relationship with tax compliance. The positive 
relationship supports that when the CEO and the chairman are the same 
individuals, it could lead to high tax compliance. However, since the result 
is not significant, hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
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The next variable is multiple directorships. Out of all the independent 
variables, only multiple directorships is significant. Thus, hypothesis 2 is 
accepted. The positive relationship between multiple directorships and tax 
compliance implies that the higher the number of multiple directorships, 
it would lead to high tax compliance. The result is consistent with the past 
studies. For instance, Richardson (1987) supports that by having multiple 
directorships, it will benefit the company in many ways. Cook and Wang 
(2011) further support that multiple directorships are favourites in UK 
companies as they will provide directors with wider experience, allowing 
personal development and the attainment of new ideas and improve business 
contacts. In the case of Malaysia, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also support 
that multiple directorships are common among non-executive directors, 
and it may be valuable for companies as they will help directors to be 
more aware of their responsibilities as well as widening their experience 
and knowledge of business activities, especially in the case of Malaysia 
where many such directors are perceived as incompetent (Othman, 1999). 
As for board independence, it has the positive but insignificant relationship 
with tax compliance. Even though the result is insignificant, the positive 
relationship between board independence independent directors indicates 
that by having independent directors on the board, it could lead to high tax 
compliance. The next variable is the board size. The result does not support 
H4 since there is no relationship between board size and tax compliance. 
Hence, H4 is rejected.
There are three control variables tested in this study. The leverage is 
positively and significantly associated with tax compliance. This reveals that 
a company with a higher leverage has high tax compliance. This is because 
when companies are carrying more debts, they are more conservative in their 
tax strategies, which leads to high compliance. The capital intensity indicates 
positive but no relationship with tax compliance. With regard to the firm 
size, the results showed that tax compliance is positively and significantly 
associated with firm size. The results supported that the larger the company, 
the higher the tax compliance. In general, large-sized firm has a greater 
likelihood of tax inspection. Thus, they spend more on tax compliance cost 
compared to small-sized firm. The overall findings are consistent with the 
other past studies which support that corporate governance does influence 
tax compliance. 
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Table 4.3: Regression Coefficient from 2012 – 2014
Variables Results
ETR 0.508
DUALITY 0.233
MULTI     0.215**
BOARD 0.469
BSIZE 0.027
LEV 0.003
CAPITEN 0.185
FSIZE 0.065
R Square 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.034
F Value 2.135*
** Significant at the 0.01 level
* Significant at the 0.05 level
Variables definitions are as follows:
ETR is a tax expense divided by Earnings before Interest and Tax 
(EBIT); DUALITY is the CEO Duality in a company; MULTI is a multiple 
directorships in a company; BOARD is a board composition; BSIZE is 
board size; LEV is the firm leverage measured as total debts divided by 
total asset; CAPITEN is capital intensity measured as fixed asset divided 
by total asset; FSIZE is firm size measured as log total asset. 
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION
In many countries, the primary goal of the government is to collect the 
taxes in accordance to the laws. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that 
the taxpayers comply with the tax regulations. The tax authorities have 
implemented various initiatives and strategies to administer and ensure 
that the correct tax is paid and to reduce to a minimum the incidences 
of non-compliance. In Malaysia, when the Security Commission issued 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, it is expected to increase the 
tax compliance level among the Malaysian’s companies. Therefore, this 
study investigates whether MCCG 2012 influences tax compliance in public 
listed companies in Malaysia. This study focuses on the internal mechanism 
of the corporate governance such as CEO Duality, multiple directorships, 
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board independence and board size. With regards to tax compliance, key 
management plays a major role in managing the tax planning in a company. 
Based on a total sample of 227 firms, the only significant finding is multiple 
directorships. When a company comprises of more directors with multiple 
directorships, it leads to high tax compliance. A director with multiple 
directorships tends to take more pro-active measures in reporting the tax 
information to minimise risk that is associated with non-compliance and 
regulatory penalties. Moreover, they also maintained an appropriate level 
of tax compliance knowledge and keep track on the current tax policy that 
could be vital in tax planning process. 
Based on overall findings, this study suggests that corporate governance 
plays a major role and in relation to the tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, 
to achieve the high tax compliance level, it is important for the continuous 
development of the corporate governance codes and guidelines. Also, the 
role of the board of directors is also important as they demonstrate oversight 
of significant tax transactions. The limitation of this study is the small 
sample size and the main focus is only the top 100 companies. Therefore, 
future research should investigate further the governance mechanisms 
and widen the focus to a few industries because the results would lead to 
how the different industries’ tax management strategies affect corporate 
governance. The government is responsible for implementing a clear, fair 
and appropriate taxation laws. Considering the crucial role played by the 
tax authorities in an efficiently functioning tax system, the findings of this 
study could provide an insight to the tax administrators on ways to keep on 
improving the tax policy so as to increase tax compliance and reduce tax 
evasion because non-compliance would result in lower government income.
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